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Trust research has become a key issue in the last few years as a novel and valid
solution to ensure the security and application in peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle-sharing networks.
The accurate measure of trust and reputation is a hard problem, most of the existing
trust mechanisms adopt the historical behavior feedback to compute trust and reputation.
Thus exploring the appropriate transaction behavior becomes a fundamental challenge. In
P2P system, each peer plays two roles: server and client with responsibility for providing
resource service and trust recommending respectively. Considering the resource service
behavior and trust recommending behavior of each peer, in this paper, we propose
a new trust model adopting the technology to calculate eigenvectors of trust rating
and recommending matrices. In our model, we deﬁne recommended reputation value to
evaluate the resource service behavior, and recommending reputation value to evaluate the
trust recommendation behavior. Our algorithm would make these two reputation values
established an interrelated relation of reinforcing mutually. The normal peers provide
authentic ﬁle uploading services, as well as give correct trust recommendation, so they can
form a trusted and cooperative transaction community via the mutual reinforcement of
recommended and recommending reputation values. In this way, the transaction behaviors
of those malicious peers are isolated and conﬁned effectively. Extensive experimental
results also conﬁrm the eﬃciency of our trust model against the threats of exaggeration,
collusion, disguise, sybil and single-behavior.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) ﬁle-sharing network has become a key research issue as a means of sharing and distributing infor-
mation, in which trust and reputation management plays a crucial role by making the participants establish an interrelated
relation of authentic cooperation and mutual beneﬁt. Trust and reputation are two related concepts, but, in fact, they are
different. Trust is a personal and subjective phenomenon that is based on various factors or evidence, and that some of those
carry more weight than others, an individual’s subjective trust can be derived from a combination of received referrals and
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ings from members in a community [1]. The concept of reputation is closely linked to that of trustworthiness, but it is
evident that there is a clear and important difference. The most distinguished difference lies in that trust systems produce a
score that reﬂects the trusting entity’s subjective view of trusted entity’s trustworthiness, whereas reputation is referred to
as a single value that represents what the community as a whole thinks about a certain user [2]. In our work, the reputation
of a peer aggregates the trust ratings of other transaction peers, which reﬂects its capability of providing resource services,
and the trust of a peer represents the direct trust ratings to the downloading source, which reﬂects its personal opinion or
conﬁdence it has in another. By collecting, distributing and aggregating the feedback about the participants’ past behaviors,
the reputation-based trust models can help participants to decide whom to trust, encourage trustworthy behavior, and deter
participation by those who are unskilled or dishonest [3].
Recently, many researches on reputation mechanism based on various methods, like fuzzy logic theory [4–6], Bayesian
network [7,8], subjective logic [9,10], social cognitive [11–14], ﬁned-grained [15,16], and game theory [17–20], have been
proposed in this ﬁeld on which both academia and industry are concentrating their attention.
1.2. Motivation
Studying and analyzing these models mentioned above, we ﬁnd that each peer’s reputation almost depends on other’s
trust ratings, but ignores the self recommending behavior. In fact, each peer not only uploads ﬁles for other requesters
to obtain the corresponding trust ratings, but also downloads ﬁles from other resource providers and gives personal trust
ratings at the same time. Therefore each of them has two transaction roles: recommended object and recommending in-
dividual. Considering these two different behaviors, we would like to establish a related relationship between them, and
make the system have an accurate measure on reputation and trust. Inspired by the link analysis algorithm [21], we deﬁne
two reputation values that are called recommended reputation value (RDRV) and recommending reputation value (RGRV)
for each peer to reﬂect the resource service behavior and trust recommending behavior respectively, and make them rely
on each other tightly. One’s recommended reputation is expressed by aggregating the recommending reputation of other
peers which have downloaded ﬁles from it; and its recommending reputation is expressed by aggregating the recommended
reputation of other peers from which it has downloaded ﬁles. RDRV is used to evaluate the behavior of providing resource
service for other peers; and RGRV used to evaluate the self recommending behavior. The interaction between RDRV and
RGRV can make the entire network form different trust communities corresponding to different types of peers. In this way
we are able to identify the normal and malicious peers effectively.
1.3. Previous works
Reputation management can be analyzed from different perspectives. In the eBay system [3], there are a short comment
on transaction and three discrete trust rating values: positive (1), negative (−1) and neutral (0). And each peer’s reputation
is calculated by aggregating the limited trust ratings without considering the short comment. The system is simple and
carried out easily, but it does not implement any measure to punish those malicious peers. Kerschbaum et al. propose
PathTrust model [22] by exploiting the maximum-weight path to get personalized reputation ratings. The model only focuses
on the reputation between initiator and candidates, but ignores other related trust ratings given by other peers to the
candidates. These two models only capture local and limited trust rating information to assess the transaction behavior,
so the calculated reputation may be one-sided. However, trying to capture the rating information completely, we not only
focus on other related trust ratings, but also consider self recommendation.
Kamvar et al. [23] propose the trust model EigenRep based on trust transitivity. At ﬁrst, the system deﬁnes some pre-
trusted peers with high reputation, but how to select and distribute these pre-trusted peers is a hard problem in large-scale
and decentralized P2P networks. Each peer’s reputation relies on the others’ trust ratings, if there are few malicious peers,
the EigenRep model can properly assess transaction behavior, but if there are a large number of malicious peers, the results
would be poor, because each malicious peer will receive plenty of exaggerated ratings from other malicious ones, and in
return gives high personal trust ratings to them, which makes a collusion threat. The drawback lies in the trust transitivity
between one peer and the other peers without isolating exaggerated ratings effectively. Therefore, how to conﬁne the trust
transitivity among malicious ones is the key. Considering the feedback, the total number of transactions, the credibility of
the feedback, transaction context and community context factors, Xiong et al. [24] propose PeerTrust model based on P-Grid
structure. This model can assess the transaction behavior properly, but it may be attached to the PGrid structure tightly.
Malicious peers may obtain relatively high reputation via exaggeration and collusion temporarily. Nevertheless, according to
interrelated relation and interaction of our algorithm, a peer, which cannot provide good resource service for other peers,
will not be able to give high personal trust rating. Therefore the reputation of malicious peers would become decreasing in
the long run.
The primary aim of trust and reputation management research is to form a trusted network and induce participants to
cooperate with each other. Driving an arbitrary overlay network into a cooperative, Wang and Nakao [20] propose an evo-
lutionary game theory (EGT)-based overlay topology evolution scheme to characterize the social dilemma for forming links
in an overlay network from the viewpoint of peers’ local interactions. The goal of literature [25] is to study equilibrium
and disequilibrium behavior of artiﬁcial agents in such systems, and explore the eﬃcient design of mechanisms to promote
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maintain a dynamic social network of others that they can trust based on similarity of cooperation. This mechanism effec-
tively incentivizes unselﬁsh behavior, where peers with higher levels of cooperation gain higher payoff. These mechanisms
all try to make the entire network become cooperative and trusted. In our work, adopting the interaction and reinforce-
ment of RDRV and RGRV, we can make those authentic peers form a trust communities, in which the peers possess high
reputation and cooperate with each other.
1.4. Challenging issues and our contribution
The anonymous, autonomous and open natures cannot ensure the P2P ﬁle-sharing networks security and application
very well. Marmol et al. [27] have shown us nine important security threat scenarios in reputation system, and it is diﬃcult
to explore a comprehensive trust mechanism to arrest various threats. Analyzing the existing trust models, we can conclude
several challenges as follows: (1) What transaction behaviors are suitable for the measure of trust and reputation? (2) How
to identify normal peers and isolate malicious peers effectively, especially the strategic ones? (3) How to resist various
threats of manipulation by different types of malicious peers?
To address the challenges, we propose a new trust model Dual-EigenRep adopting the technology to calculate the eigen-
vectors of trust rating and recommending matrices. Our main contribution includes: (1) Taking the resource service behavior
and trust recommending behavior into account, we design two reputation values for each peer. The RDRV reﬂects the capac-
ity of providing resource service for other peers; and the RGRV reﬂects the capacity of recommending downloading source
peers. (2) We propose the deﬁnitions of RDRV and RGRV. Each peer’s RDRV aggregates the personal trust ratings and RGRV
of other peers which have downloaded ﬁles from this peer; and its RGRV aggregates the self trust ratings and RDRV of other
peers from which it has downloaded ﬁles. The inner interrelated relation and interaction of these two reputation values can
drive the entire network into different trust communities, which identify different types of peers. With the increase of
transaction amount, the reputation of those normal peers would become higher, and the probability that they are selected
as downloading sources also become larger. Thus the transactions with malicious peers are restricted markedly.
1.5. Comparing our new results to related works
In order to verify the availability and rationality of our trust mechanism, we compare the successful downloading per-
centage with EigenTrust, PathTrust and Random models, and ranking error ratio with HopRec [28] and EigenRep models.
We design several types of commonly used threats, as well as another two special types for our model. The experimental
results show that our trust model can achieve a better performance against these threats.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we detail the Dual-EigenRep model. In Section 3, we
present the simulation parameters, classify peers as different types and analyze the corresponding simulation results. Finally,
some conclusions are introduced in Section 4.
2. Dual-EigenRep
In this section, we describe our trust model in detail. Firstly, some simple preliminaries are introduced; secondly, recom-
mended and recommending reputation values are deﬁned respectively, then based on them, we propose the unique global
reputation; thirdly, the convergence of our algorithm is proved in theory to verify the stability of entire network; ﬁnally, we
make an analysis of our trust model.
2.1. Preliminaries
In P2P ﬁle-sharing networks, the transaction relation happened among peers can be presented by a directed weighted
graph G(V , E), V = |v| denotes the number of system peers, E = {i| j ∈ Trans(i), li j} represents the personal trust rating,
Trans(i) is the set of peers from which peer i has downloaded resource, and li j is the personal trust rating from peers i
to j. After a certain number of transactions, the entire network would form a web of trust, the weight between a pair of
arbitrary peers is the personal trust rating as described in Fig. 1.
2.2. Reputation computation
Each time peer i downloads a ﬁle from peer j, it may rate their transaction as successful when the downloaded ﬁle is
satisfactory, or unsuccessful when the downloaded ﬁle is unsatisfactory. Based on these feedback information, we deﬁne the
personal trust rating li j as successful percentage of individual transactions that peer i has downloaded ﬁles from peer j
li j =
{
max(pij ,0)∑
m max(pim,0)
if
∑
mmax(pim,0) = 0,
0 otherwise,
(1)
pij = succ(i, j) − unsucc(i, j). (2)
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Here succ(i, j) is the number of successful transactions peer i deems, unsucc(i, j) is the number of unsuccessful transac-
tions peer i deems, and max(pij,0) represents the larger.
Considering the resource service and trust recommending behaviors, we design RDRV and RGRV for each peer as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Recommended reputation value td(i) of peer i is the aggregation of trust ratings and reputation of those peers
that have downloaded ﬁles from it, like td(3) in Fig. 2.
Deﬁnition 2. Recommending reputation value tg(i) of peer i is the aggregation of self trust recommendations and reputation
of the peers from which it has downloaded ﬁles, like tg(3) in Fig. 2.
Therefore, the RDRV and RGRV are deﬁned as
td(i) =
∑
j∈I(i)
l ji · tg( j), (3)
tg(i) =
∑
j∈O (i)
li j · td( j). (4)
We can get td(i), tg(i) ∈ (0,1) via normalization process in Algorithm 1, let I(i) represent the set of peers which have
downloaded ﬁles from peer i, and O (i) represent the set of peers from which peer i has downloaded ﬁles. The more the
peers belonged to I(i), the larger the RDRV, which illuminates peer i can provide more ﬁle uploading services, meanwhile,
a good peer can give correct recommendation to others. RDRV and RGRV are strongly interrelated and interactive.
However, we should pay more attention to the RDRV while conﬁrming the unique global reputation, because RDRV
reﬂects others’ personal trust ratings, which may be more objective and trusted to some extent. Therefore a coeﬃcient α is
designed to adjust the proportion weight, and the global reputation value is deﬁned as
t(i) = α · td(i) + (1− α) · tg(i). (5)
To get the exact value of α, several simulations are performed in Section 3.3. Experimental results show that the number
of successful transactions is largest when α is 0.75 compared with 0.5, 0.65 and 0.85. The results become better with the
increase of α, but decrease immediately when α is 0.85, so the most suitable value should be neither too large nor too
small.
In distributed P2P networks, the implementation of query and storage on rating information is very crucial and hard.
Some of trust mechanisms, such as EigenRep, PeerTrust and PowerTrust [29], are based on a DHT (distributed hash table) to
store, search and calculate trust value. However, most of P2P systems deployed on Internet are unstructured [2]. Therefore,
in this paper a simple list is designed for each peer to store the rating information to other peers based on the transaction
behavior whether the peer got the authentic sources or not.
Fig. 2. The expressions of td(3) and tg (3).
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Algorithm 1 Global reputation value.
1: Input: personal trust rating l(i, j), initial column vectors vd and vg , parameters τ , k and α
2: Output: global reputation value t(n);
Initiation of RDRV and RGRV line 3–5
3: for for i from 1 to n do
4: td(i) ← vd
5: tg (i) ← vg
6: end for
Power iteration line 7–25
7: while (δ  τ ) do
8: for i from 1 to n do
9: for j from 1 to n do
10: td(i) ← sum_td + l( j, i) · tg ( j)
11: tg (i) ← sum_tg + l(i, j) · td( j)
12: end for
13: end for
Normalization process line 14–21
14: for i from 1 to n do
15: sumz_td ← sumz_td + td(i) · td(i)
16: sumz_tg ← sumz_tg + tg (i) · tg (i)
17: end for
18: for i from 1 to n do
19: td(i) = td(i)/sqrt(sumz_td)
20: tg (i) = tg (i)/sqrt(sumz_tg )
21: end for
Condition parameter line 22–24
22: for i from 1 to n do
23: δ = |t(k+1)d (i) − t(k)d (i)| + |t(k+1)g (i) − t(k)g (i)|;
24: end for
25: end while
Global reputation value line 26–28
26: for i from 1 to n do
27: t(i) = α · td(i) + (1− α) · tg (i)
28: end for
29: Return t(i)
As shown in Fig. 3, peer 1 has two transaction partners 2 and 4, and the number of successful transactions with peer
2 is 10, while the unsuccessful number is 15. The last item t( j) represents the partner’s global reputation value. This list
is updated timely if there exists any change about succ(i, j), unsucc(i, j) and t( j) with the continual transactions. Each
peer stores the local information, and simultaneously inquires the partners’ rating information from other peers, then, by
aggregating all the rating information derived from different peers, the partners’ global reputation values can be calcu-
lated.
The personal trust rating reﬂects the historical transaction behavior between a pair of arbitrary peers, which represents
a peer has the direct opinion in others; and the global reputation value reﬂects the aggregated personal trust ratings,
which represents the common view of trustworthiness. Algorithm 1 lists the implementation process to calculate the global
reputation. Analyzing Algorithm 1, we can get that the time complexity mainly depends on the computation process of td
and tg . Each time while calculating the reputation value, each peer always aggregates the others’ personal trust ratings on
the transaction partners, this process needs O (n) steps, thus, the computation complexity of the total system peers would
take O (n2) steps. Moreover, each peer needs to maintain a local (n×n)-dimensional storage list (succ(i, j) and unsucc(i, j)).
2.3. Proof of convergence
Usually, the directed weighted graph can be expressed by using adjacency matrix equal to the personal trust rating
matrix l here. In this paper, all the peers’ reputation values are viewed as a column vector, and td is used to express RDRV
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t(k+1)d = lT · t(k)g , (6)
t(k+1)g = l · t(k)d . (7)
Here lT is the transpose of matrix l, and k is the iteration number. Based on the above formulas, we can transform them
into:
td = lT · tg = lT · l · td, (8)
tg = l · td = l · lT · tg . (9)
Suppose that lT · l = M , l · lT = N , there will be MT = (lT · l)T = lT · l = M , NT = (l · lT )T = l · lT = N , so both M and N are
symmetric Matrices.
Now we introduce three preliminary theorems for the convergence proof of our algorithm:
Theorem 1. The eigenvalues of symmetric matrices are real.
Theorem 2. The eigenvectors of a symmetric matrix M corresponding to different eigenvalues are orthogonal to each other.
Theorem 3. If k is a positive integer, λ is an eigenvalue of the matrix M, x is the corresponding eigenvector, then λk is an eigenvalue of
Mk and x is the corresponding eigenvector.
Next we prove the convergence in detail.
Theorem 4. td converges to the principal eigenvector of matrix M, and tg converges to the principal eigenvector of matrix N.
Proof. The matrix M can be considered as to be composed of a certain number of connected components with no connec-
tions between each other according to [30]:
M =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
M1 0 · · · 0
0 M2 · · · 0
...
. . .
0 0 · · · Mm
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
Each of these matrices M1,M2, . . . ,Mm is a real, irreducible and nonnegative symmetric matrix, with real nonnegative
eigenvalues, since the eigenvalues of lT l are real and nonnegative (Theorem 1). The eigenvalues of M are given by the sum
of eigenvalues of different matrix Mi , i = 1,2, . . . ,m, and each of them which is different from 0 has a strictly dominant
eigenvalue, i.e. an eigenvalue which is strictly greater than all the other eigenvalues of the matrix; moreover, all the entries
of its associated eigenvector are greater than 0. We can see that the eigenvectors of matrix M can be obtained from the
eigenvectors of the matrices M1,M2, . . . ,Mm by just considering 0 the entries corresponding to the other matrices. Suppose
that the λ1  λ2 · · ·λn  0 corresponding to the eigenvectors x1, x2, . . . , xn , each of them is related to the particular diagonal
block of above matrix. If more than one matrix Mi has a strictly dominant eigenvalue equal to λ1. Without loss of generality,
we suppose that M has the eigenvalues λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λr > λr+1  λr+2  · · ·  λn with r maximum eigenvalues. The
eigenvectors x1, x2, . . . , xr are related to the r different matrices Mh1 ,Mh2 , . . . ,Mhr , so that x j , 1 j  r, has positive entries
corresponding to the diagonal block Mh j .
Based on the consideration ℵ = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} as an orthonormal basis for Rn in [30] (Theorem 2), we deﬁne an initial
vector v to be equal to t(0)d :
v = t(0)d = α1x1 + α2x2 + · · · + αrxr + · · · + αnxn.
According to [30], we can get the α j > 0, j = 1,2, . . . , r, since at least one entry of lT in each row j corresponding to a
row of Mh j in above component matrix must be greater than 0, because Mh j represents a connected graph, thus, in every
row it must have at least one entry that is greater than 0. Then we can get the following results:
t(1)d = M · t(0)d = M · v
= α1Mx1 + α2Mx2 + · · · + αrMxr + · · · + αnMxn
= α1λ1x1 + α2λ2x2 + · · · + αrλrxr + · · · + αnλnxn,
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= α1M2x1 + α2M2x2 + · · · + αrM2xr + · · · + αnM2xn
= α1λ21x1 + α2λ22x2 + · · · + αrλ2r xr + · · · + αnλ2nxn,
...
t(k)d = M · t(k−1)d = Mk · v
= α1Mkx1 + α2Mkx2 + · · · + αrMkxr + · · · + αnMkxn
= α1λk1x1 + α2λk2x2 + · · · + αrλkr xr + · · · + αnλknxn.
Since λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λr , then we have
t(k)d = λk1
(
α1x1 + α2x2 + · · · + αrxr + · · · + αn
(
λn
λ1
)k
xn
)
= λk1
(
α1x1 + α2x2 + · · · + αrxr +
n∑
i=r+1
αi
(
λi
λ1
)k
xi
)
,
where limk→∞( λiλ1 )
k = 0, i = r + 1, . . . ,n, then t(k)d = λk1(α1x1 + α2x2 + · · · + αrxr). Thus td converges to the principal
eigenvector of matrix M corresponding to the principal eigenvalue λ1, similarly, tg converges to principal eigenvector of
matrix N . 
2.4. Dual-EigenRep analysis
In our algorithm, each peer possesses rated and recommending features. The rated feature represents the capacity of
providing resource for others, which reﬂects that it is an important downloading source; and the recommending feature
represents the capacity of giving correct recommendation to service sources, which reﬂects that it is a junction center to
link good peers together.
After a certain number of mutual transactions, a good peer will provide a large number of authentic resources for other
peers and get plenty of positive ratings, thus it must be directed by many other ones like td(5) in Fig. 4; meanwhile, a good
peer also gives correct self-recommendation to other downloading sources while ﬁnishing transactions, thus it will direct
many other peers like tg(2) in Fig. 4. These good peers would be linked together and reinforce each other mutually, which
forms an interrelated relationship via our algorithm.
We can explain this phenomenon via trust matrix M = lT l, let (M)i j = mij , then we get: mij =∑nk=1 lkilkj , since the
(lT )ik = lki , from this formula we see that the generic entry mij is a nonzero entry if and only if there is at least one peer
k with rating information towards peers i and j at the same time. This means that the peer k will play the role as a link
junction and drive peers i and j into an interrelated relationship.
Generally speaking, a peer gets positive trust ratings by uploading authentic ﬁle resource. However, for a malicious peer,
it can still get positive and exaggerated trust ratings from other malicious ones as shown in Fig. 5, in which white and
black nodes represent normal and malicious peers respectively. The RDRV of malicious peers may become relatively high
by exaggerating personal trust ratings, but their RGRV would be small because of unauthentic or non-recommendation to
normal peers, which would decrease the global reputation. For a normal peer, it provides authentic ﬁle uploading service,
as well as gives authentic personal trust ratings, thus both RDRV and RGRV would be high as shown in Fig. 6.
With the increase of transactions, the normal peers with authentic services will get many positive ratings; and the ma-
licious peers with unauthentic services will get many negative ratings. We would like to illuminate our model via Fig. 7, in
which nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are supposed to serve as normal peers, and the others to serve as different types of malicious
peers. Nodes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 are collective malicious peers; Nodes 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 are disguised malicious peers, and
some of them get positive ratings from normal peers by providing authentic ﬁles in some cases when selected as down-
loading sources; Node 17 only recommends peers, and does not provide ﬁle uploading service; on the contrary, node 18
only provides ﬁle uploading service, and does not give personal trust ratings; and node 19 is a sybil peer with two new
Fig. 4. The interrelated relation between td and tg .
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Fig. 7. Interrelated relation among different types of peers.
identities to prevent from gaining negative trust ratings. The details on these different types of peers will be introduced in
Section 3.1.
After a certain number of transactions, the entire network will form different trust communities corresponding to differ-
ent types of peers as shown in Fig. 7. The community composed of the normal peers is trusted, and the members in it are
cooperative with each other.
However, there may be some problems worth to be discussed. For instance, if more than 50% collective malicious peers
exist and make a collusion threat, can our trust model resist it? According to characteristic of our algorithm, these malicious
peers would form a strongly linked transaction relation and get relatively high reputation via exaggerated trust ratings. But
we should also focus on the personal trust ratings given by normal peers, which would provide negative ratings and reduce
their reputation gradually. Therefore, the malicious peers may have high reputation temporarily, but they cannot keep this
situation for a long time. And simulation results in Section 3.5 also conﬁrm the eﬃciency of our algorithm against collusion
threat made by plenty of malicious peers.
3. Experimental results and analysis
3.1. Types of peers
Considering the behavior of peers, we mainly classify them into two types: normal and malicious. The normal peers pro-
vide authentic ﬁle uploading services, as well as give authentic trust recommendation (personal trust ratings); the malicious
peers not only provide unauthentic ﬁle uploading services, but also give unauthentic recommendation, even calumniate or
pretend to be normal peers. Considering the variability of malicious peers, we deﬁne several types of threats as follows:
(1) Individual malicious peers (IMP): this type of malicious peers provides unauthentic ﬁle uploading services, as well as
gives unauthentic personal trust ratings to others.
(2) Collective malicious peers (CMP): on the one hand these malicious peers provide unauthentic ﬁle uploading services,
cheat and calumniate normal peers; on the other hand, they give exaggerated personal trust ratings to other malicious
ones mutually, which makes a serious collusion threat.
(3) Disguised malicious peers (DMP): these disguised malicious peers provide authentic and popular ﬁles to get high reputa-
tion in some cases when selected as downloading sources, then, they give high personal trust ratings to other malicious
ones. This type of malicious peers has the IMP and CMP characteristics.
(4) Sybil attack: each time one of these malicious peers is selected as a service provider, it provide a bad service. Then, it
is replaced with a new identity. This kind of attack might prove quite problematic because it prevents authentic peers
from being able to obtain high reputation, since they might not be selected most of the times.
(5) Single recommended-peers (SRDP): these malicious peers only provide unauthentic ﬁles uploading services, but do not
give any personal trust ratings to others.
(6) Single recommending-peers (SRGP): contrary to SRDP, these malicious peers only negatively recommend other peers,
but do not provide ﬁle uploading services.
The IMP, CMP, DMP and sybil attack are commonly used threats, and SRDP and SRGP are designed specially for our
model to verify the reasonability and correctness that RDRV contributes a little more to the global reputation.
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Parameter conﬁguration.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Peers of system 600 Round each cycle 30
Files of system 6000 Simulation operation 10
Types of ﬁles 100 Request peers each round 120
Simulation cycles 20 Reputation values initialization 1/600
Fig. 8. The SDP with different values of α.
3.2. Experiment conﬁguration and evaluation criterion
Since the similarity between social network and P2P network, we design a power-law P2P network to simulate the
different types of threats. During the simulation, some peers are able to issue service requests for downloading ﬁles, which
are propagated by broadcast through entire network in the usual Gnutella way; meanwhile, other peers are able to respond
to these requests. The peers which receive the service requests will check if they have the requested ﬁles. There may be two
or more peers that have the requested ﬁles, then, the requester will select the peer which has the largest global reputation
value as downloading source. Table 1 lists the parameter conﬁguration in our simulation.
Seen from the table, our system has 600 peers with 6000 ﬁles which are classiﬁed into 100 ﬁle types, and each peer has
10 ﬁles. In each simulation, 20 cycles are included. For each cycle, 120 peers issue 120 ﬁle downloading requests randomly,
which are performed 30 rounds. In addition, we initialize RDRV and RGRV of each peer as 1/600. In order to get the accurate
values, we always perform 10 simulation operations and calculate their average value as the ﬁnal result.
To evaluate the performance of trust model rationally, we propose successful downloading percentage (SDP) as the
measure criterion. Generally speaking, the more the number of successful transactions, the better the performance. So we
deﬁne the SDP as
ϕ =
∑
i
∑
j succ(i, j)∑
i
∑
j (succ(i, j) + unsucc(i, j))
(10)
succ(i, j) and unsucc(i, j) are deﬁned in Section 2.2. It presents the satisfactory transaction percentage in the entire network.
3.3. Proportion coeﬃcient α and iteration number
We deem that RDRV contributes a little more to the global reputation value because of the objective trust ratings given
by others, and several simulations are performed while existing different percentages of malicious peers when α are 0.5,
0.65, 0.75 and 0.85. The simulation results show that SDP is best when α is 0.75 as described in Fig. 8. The SDP become
better with the increase of α, but it decreases when α is 0.85, so we may select 0.75 as the suitable value.
In EigenRep model, the ﬁnal reputation value will converge to the principal eigenvector of local trust matrix, similarly,
the HopRec model also converges to the principal eigenvector of [α ·RWhop + (1−α) · e · pT ]T . According to the convergence
proof in Section 2.3, the RDRV and RGRV converge to the principal eigenvectors of matrices M and N respectively. All
these algorithms adopt power iteration to calculate the reputation values. As we know, the number of iteration controls the
overheads of the algorithm, as well as reﬂects the convergence rate. Generally speaking, the more the number of iteration
is, the higher the precision of calculated reputation values to some extent. As the conﬁguration of increment in HopRec
model, we also set conditional increment τ = 10−4 in this paper.
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Several simulations on iteration number are performed for IMP, Sybil, CMP and DMP, and the results are presented
in Fig. 9. Seen from the curves, the CMP’s iteration cycle is relatively longer compared with others, which shows the
seriousness of this type of malicious threat and hardness to crawl those pre-trusted peers. In general, these three trust
mechanisms almost have a similar convergence rate more or less.
3.4. IMP simulation and analysis
These individual malicious peers cheat independently. They provide unauthentic ﬁle uploading services, as well as
give unauthentic personal trust ratings. Based on these characteristics, we run simulations with Dual-EigenRep, EigenRep,
PathTrust and Random models. In our simulation, the Random model presents that those request peers randomly select an-
other response peer as downloading source without implementing any reputation management. We depict the experimental
results in Fig. 10.
Seen from Fig. 10, the performance of Dual-EigenRep is better than other models. Owing to the dual-reputation, the SDP
can maintain high level even when the malicious peers are 55%. However, the EigenRep performs well at ﬁrst because of
little blindness resulting from those pre-trusted peers deﬁned previously, but the SDP declines obviously with the increase of
malicious peers because of the trust transitivity among plenty of malicious peers. In PathTrust model, it only considers the
personal trust values between initiator and candidates as the criterion of selecting downloading source without aggregating
complete related trust ratings to the candidates, so its performance is poor. And the curve of Random model decreases
almost linearly with the percentage increase of malicious peers, which may meets the property of random selection from
the response peers.
3.5. CMP simulation and analysis
This type of malicious peers collaborates with each other and make a serious threat. They always exaggerate the per-
sonal trust ratings mutually. In our simulation, we set that a malicious peer will give personal trust ratings to the other
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Fig. 12. The SDP with different percentages of TMP. Fig. 13. The SDP with different percentages of DMP.
malicious peers once it has a transaction. Based on these characteristics, we run simulations and the results are described
in Fig. 11.
Faced with the collusion threats, Dual-EigenRep performs well compared with other models. EigenRep performs poorly
because it cannot identify and isolate those collective malicious peers effectively. With the increase of malicious peers,
some of them will get high reputation, then, they in return give high personal trust ratings to other malicious ones under
trust transitivity chain. In this way most of these malicious peers get relatively high reputation via mutual exaggeration
ratings with each other. However, our model makes those normal peers form a trusted and cooperative community, and the
reputation values of normal peers become larger and larger via normalization process, by which the transaction behavior of
malicious peers are conﬁned markedly. PathTrust only calculates the personal trust ratings between initiator and candidates,
so it can arrest the collusion behavior to some extent, and it performs relatively better than EigenRep. And the Random
model is changeless, because it does not refer to any feedback information and reputation dependence.
3.6. DMP simulation and analysis
This type includes individual and disguised malicious peers. The disguised malicious peers are cunning, they provide
popular and authentic ﬁles for normal peers to get high reputation values in some cases when selected as downloading
sources, then give high personal trust ratings to individual malicious peers. The disguised peers are deﬁned as 50% of the
total malicious peers (TMP) in our simulation, and the results are shown in Fig. 12.
At ﬁrst, the performance of EigenRep is good because of the pre-trusted peers which can resist the temptation of those
disguised peers. But the SDP declines with the increase of malicious peers. However, in our model, it evaluates the global
reputation from two aspects: RDRV and RGRV. For the disguised peers, they can get high trust ratings by providing authentic
services, but their RGRV would be low because of no or unauthentic recommendation to the normal ones. So Dual-EigenRep
can conﬁne the global reputation values of disguised peers effectively. PathTrust just selects the maximum-weight paths
as the trust value between initiator and candidates, and avoid the trust transitivity between disguised peers and those
candidates more or less, so the experiment results are a little better than EigenRep. And the Random model is changeless
as well.
In addition, if there are more disguised peers while the amount of TMP is certain, the number of successful transactions
will be larger because the disguised peers can provide more authentic ﬁles for requesters. Therefore we run four simulations
with different percentages of disguised peers when the total malicious peers are 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. And the simulation
results also verify our thought as described in Fig. 13.
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3.7. Sybil simulation and analysis
Providing bad services for other requesters, meanwhile, these malicious peers create many new identities to prevent
from being given negative ratings. They not only provide unauthentic ﬁle services, but also give negative ratings to others.
However, this type of malicious peers does not make a united attack. Based on these characteristics, we run simulations
and the results are described in Fig. 14.
Seen from the simulation results, our model can still perform well with the increase of malicious peers. Firstly, the
EigenRep model has a good behavior because the high reputation of pre-trusted peers which are selected as the downloading
sources, nevertheless, the results become poor with the increase of malicious peers. These malicious peers can create some
new identities to avoid negative ratings, but they cannot gain positive ratings from other requesters, besides, they do not
give correct ratings to other normal peers, thus both RDRV and RGRV would be small. From the global view, EigenRep
aggregates the other peers’ personal trust ratings to calculate the unique reputation for each peer, the results may be all-
sided to some extent. Different from the EigenRep, PathTrust just regards the personal trust ratings as the selection criterion
whether to have a transaction. Because these malicious peers create many new identities, it is diﬃcult to give them negative
ratings and decrease the personal trust, so the simulation results are a little poorer than EigenRep.
3.8. SRDP and SRGP simulation and analysis
We specially design two types of extreme peers for our trust mode. The SRDP only provide unauthentic ﬁle uploading
service for other peers, but do not give personal trust ratings; on the contrary, the SRGP only give unauthentic recommen-
dation to other peers, but do not provide ﬁle uploading service. According to these characteristics, we run simulations and
the results are shown in Fig. 15.
The results illuminate that they make a weak threat because of lacking collusion. However, the SRDP performs a little
better than the SRGP with our trust model, which also explains the rationality and correctness that the RDRV contributes a
little more to the global reputation.
3.9. Ranking error ratio
Considering the limited evaluation and comparison to the old trust mechanism EigenTrust, we compare another trust
mechanism HopRec, and introduce ranking error ratio as a new evaluation criterion to reﬂect the performance.
As the deﬁnition in [31], the ranking error ratio is |B|/|A|, here set A denotes the high reputation-ranking list returned
by trust schemes, and set B represents the list of malicious peers included in set A. Moreover, the size of list A equals the
number of normal peers in the system. To illuminate the precision of our algorithm, several simulations are performed on
ranking error ration based on the proposed types of malicious peers. During the process of simulations, we set the amount
of malicious peers as 50% of the system peers while running Sybil, CMP and DMP. However, 25% are set as disguised
peers (front peers in [2,28,31]) and the other 25% as ordinary malicious peers, the experimental results are described in
Fig. 16.
Seen from the above results, the ranking error ratio of EigenRep obviously performs worse than Dual-EigenRep and
HopRec. The reason lies in that EigenRep cannot prevent the malicious peers from propagating their trust values to other
malicious ones. On the contrary, the Dual-EigenRep would make the normal peers form a trust community which consists
of a large number of normal peers to arrest unauthentic trust ratings. The HopRec could detect the malicious peers, and
assign low recommendation ability to those malicious peers. The sybil peers can create many new identiﬁcation to escape
the negative ratings, it is hard to evaluate the RDRV appropriately using Dual-EigenRep mechanism. However, the HopRec
can restrict the malicious peers’ reputation values by dampening the recommendation ability of recommending peers in the
hop to the initial malicious seeds, thus HopRec performs a little better than Dual-EigenRep while facing the sybil malicious
peers.
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In HopRec mechanism, the recommendation ability can exponentially dampen in the hop to initial malicious peers,
and CMP and DMP collaborate with each other and make exaggeration-intensive ratings to other malicious peers, the hop
number may be relatively large sometimes (maximal hop numbers is 6 in [28]), the recommendation ability would not
be decreased effectively. Nevertheless, Dual-EigenRep makes the normal peers reinforce each other and form a trusted
community, which isolates the collusion behavior among CMP and DMP in a valid way. Therefore Dual-EigenRep performs
better slightly on the condition of CMP and DMP.
3.10. Discussion
The service and recommendation behaviors are the basis for computing reputation in our paper. We propose these two
different behaviors on the condition of considering the two different roles played by each peer. The service behavior reﬂects
the resource providing ability as a server, and recommendation behavior reﬂects the trust recommendation ability as a
client. In literatures [2,28,31], the authors propose recommendation ability to infer more accurate reputation ranking based
on logistic model, hop number and disproportional way, which is similar to the recommendation behavior proposed in
our paper from the view point that peers with different trusted levels should have different recommendation ranking. But,
in fact, another purpose of introducing recommendation behavior in our paper is to link the normal peers together as a
junction presented by trust matrix in Section 2.4. Therefore there exists a difference on recommendation behavior between
our work and literatures [2,28,31].
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new trust model Dual-EigenRep adopting the technology to calculate the principal eigen-
vectors of the behavior matrices. Considering the different transaction behaviors, we deﬁne RDRV to reﬂect the resource
service behavior, and RGRV to reﬂect the trust recommending behavior. Our algorithm makes them rely on each other and
establish an interrelated relation. After a certain number of transactions, the entire network forms different trust commu-
nities corresponding to different types of peers. Furthermore, we prove the convergence of our algorithm to guarantee the
1750 X. Fan et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 1737–1750stability of entire network. Extensive simulation results also show that our model can achieve better against the threats of
exaggeration, collusion, disguise, sybil and single-behavior.
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